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FEDERAL JUDGES AND FEARING
THE "FLOODGATES OF LITIGATION"
TobyJ. Stern"
Today's caseloads make it a question of some moment whetherjudges
legitimately may consider caseload effects when deciding a case.-Judge Richard A. Posner
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two hundred years, judges in the United States have
expressed a desire to avoid opening the "floodgates of litigation"
upon the court system.2 Although in many cases unfounded,' the ar-
gument has persisted and judges frecjuently invoke it today, including
those on our nation's highest Court. Given the high caseloads in the
federal courts today,5 the fear of "opening the floodgates" is especially
understandable.6
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2001, The Johns Hop-
kins University. Many thanks to Andrew Levine and Professor Catherine Struve for their help-
ful and insightful criticisms on earlier drafts of this piece. I also benefited from the comments
of Malia Ebel, Heather Harkulich, and Sydney Stern. Finally, thank you to Jennifer Adams,
Clark Craddock, Charles Rombeau, and Carlos S. Montoya for their editing assistance. All re-
maining errors, then, are mine.
I RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 315 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Whitbeck v. Cook, 15Johns. 482, 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) ("If it could succeed, a
flood-gate of litigation would be opened, and for many years to come, this kind of action would
abound.").
3 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 317 ("[T]his concern was seen as a thin excuse for not want-
ing to create new rights, since the judges knew nothing about the actual capacity of the judicial
system, which was actually underutilized.").
4 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 489 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority's holding "threatens to release a torrent of
litigation"); see also In re Lawrence, 293 F.3d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 2002) (claiming that the recogni-
tion of an exception to resjudicata could open the floodgates of litigation).
5 For example, in the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2001, there were over 55,000
appeals filed in the United States courts of appeals alone. Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, tbl.B (2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/contents.html (Mar. 31, 2002).
In this Comment, I focus on the federal courts. This is a matter of convenience-most of
the scant scholarly writing on caseloads and judicial economy focuses on the federal courts.
Additionally, the Constitution deals directly with those courts. It should be noted, though, that
the floodgates argument is found just as frequently in state courts. See, e.g., E. Dredging &
Constr., Inc. v. Parliament House, L.L.C., 698 So. 2d 102, 105 (Ala. 1997) ("[I]f this Court were
to hold otherwise, such a decision could potentially open the floodgates of litigation.").
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This Comment answers Judge Posner's aforementioned question
in the negative. Although rising caseloads have had negative effects
on the judicial craft,7 I argue that in almost all situations, the fear of
increased litigation is not a valid judicial argument. The thesis is
simple: in most situations, the floodgates argument is inappropriate.
This proposition is based on the limitations found in Article III of the
Constitution and considerations of the proper role of the judiciary
vis-a-vis the other branches of government."
My arguments focus on opinions in which ajudge argues against a
certain option due to a fear of unleashing a wave of litigation upon
the court system. Nonetheless, the scope of this Comment should
not be confined to the literal invocation of the floodgates, but rather
to any similar argument.9
In Part I, I introduce the floodgates argument and offer examples
of its historical and modern uses. I characterize the floodgates argu-
ment as a special type of judicial economy argument. I also discuss
types of cases where the floodgates argument tends to recur, such as
those involving antitrust actions under the Clayton Act or those in-
volving intervenors seeking next friend status. The floodgates argu-
ment recurs in these cases because they involve areas of law where a
broad ruling might provide future plaintiffs an incentive to bring a
suit in federal court.
In Part II, I discuss the caseload rise in the federal courts that has
occurred over the past forty years. I discuss the implications of that
rise on both the judicial craft in general and on the legitimacy of ju-
dicial concern for its own efficiency. There are several reasons for
the rise in the federal caseload-including population increases,
congressional grants of federal jurisdiction to remedy employment
discrimination, broader Supreme Court interpretations of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and of habeas corpus doctrines, and additional sources such as
the reduction in legal costs. I also discuss the effects of the caseload
on court functioning, including resolution of more cases in the pre-
trial stages and a greater reliance by some judges on their law clerks
in order to provide timelyjustice. I conclude Part II with a discussion
of Judge Posner's thoughts on when, if ever, it is appropriate for a
judge to take caseload considerations into account when ruling on a
legal matter.
See infra Part I.C.
8 See infra Parts III.A and III.B.
9 Similar arguments include those warning of an "epidemic, avalanche, flood, tidal wave or
deluge of litigation." Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Altegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
65 (1983). There are, of course, even more euphemisms for "floodgates," such as "explosion"
and "torrent."
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In Part III, I present my criticism of the floodgates argument in
two parts: (1) constitutional concerns regarding the proper role of
the federal judiciary with respect to controlling the rise in caseload,
and (2) more general or prudential concerns regarding the structure
and analytical rigor behind common uses of the floodgates argument.
My constitutional argument is twofold. First, I argue that since Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution leaves control over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to Congress, a ruling based on a concern over judicial
economy would be a separation of powers violation. That is, if the
federal courts are overburdened, Congress must ameliorate the situa-
tion through its control of federal court jurisdiction. The second
component of my constitutional argument asserts that in the realm of
statutory interpretation, invoking the floodgates argument improp-
erly attributes a caseload-limiting desire to Congress that it may not
have had, or at least that the proponent of the floodgates argument
does not explicitly recognize.
My nonconstitutional argument (which I refer to as my "pruden-
tial" case against the floodgates) points out the argumentative holes
that exist in common usages of the floodgates argument. First, I criti-
cize floodgates arguments because they are not accompanied by an
analysis tending to demonstrate that a certain judicial decision would,
in fact, lead to a high amount of new federal court litigation. Second,
I observe that the floodgates argument is almost never the central
component of its proponent's legal argument. I question the neces-
sity of this seemingly ancillary argument (especially considered
alongside the argument's other flaws).
My third prudential criticism is that use of this flawed argument is
often seen as pretext for other considerations. One concern is that
the argument might simply be pretext for reducing the burden of the
high federal caseload on a judge arguing against opening the flood-
gates. As such, it calls into question, as Judge Posner puts it, the
"perceived legitimacy" of that judge's role. Finally, I note the prob-
lem of consistency: even if judges were to carefully explain why they
believed that a certain decision would lead to a rash of litigation,
there is no touchstone for what constitutes a mere acceptable rise in
caseload and what constitutes a flood of litigation so heavy that it
should alter the outcome of a case.
If my criticisms of the floodgates argument and its uses may be
considered an "anti-floodgates rule," then my next subsection ex-
plores suitable exceptions to that rule. That is, I explain the situa-
tions in which a floodgates argument would not suffer constitutional
flaws. Before I explain these exceptions, however, I note that the ex-
ceptions do not overcome the prudential flaws in floodgates argu-
ments.
My first exception allows that a floodgates argument might be ap-
propriate in the realm of statutory interpretation when limiting fed-
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eral court caseloads would advance the statutory purpose of the law at
issue. Thus I argue that when interpreting provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, for example, floodgates considerations might
be appropriate since that statute was enacted, in part, to curb "frivo-
lous lawsuits."
My second exception is related to the first; it states that floodgates
arguments may be appropriate in statutory interpretation when a
flood of lawsuits would frustrate that law's statutory purpose. For ex-
ample, a court might decide that an interpretation of the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a law which sought (in part) to
curb federal habeas corpus petitions, would lead to a flood of habeas
petitions that would frustrate that law's habeas-limiting purpose.
I call my third exception the "total judicial failure" exception.
This exception is reserved for a situation in which a court is faced
with the opportunity to rule in a way that would lead to so many law-
suits that it would essentially grind the federal courts to a halt. Al-
though such a situation seems unlikely, it is still necessary to recog-
nize it as an exception. In short, I am arguing that the Constitution's
framers would not have created a court system in Article III and then
allowed those courts to make themselves nearly useless.
My fourth exception recognizes that a fear of increased litigation
may not be premised on the burden it would put on the federal court
system. This exception would arise in situations where a flood of liti-
gation could threaten the effectiveness of a branch of government
other than the courts. This consideration (among others) underlays
the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald to grant the Presi-
dent of the United States absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for ac-
tions taken in his official capacity.
Finally, I argue, albeit cautiously, that if a court truly were to have
no guidance either way on an issue (or if two options were in a deci-
sional dead heat), caseload considerations would be appropriate.
In Part IV, I apply my reasoning to what I consider a difficult ex-
ample-one that walks the line between the rule I offer and its excep-
tions. I first lay the groundwork for my example, in which I consider
whether the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey should
be applied retroactively on collateral review. In the Apprendi decision,
the Court held that any fact (other than a prior conviction) which
causes a criminal sentence to be longer than the statutory maximum
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. An additional
question, which the Apprendi Court did not address, is whether pris-
oners may collaterally attack their sentences that would have violated
Apprendi had it been the law of the land at the time of their sentenc-
ing. This question has vast implications for federal court caseloads:
if prisoners were permitted to prevail on such a theory, then thou-
sands of eligible prisoners would have potentially meritorious law-
suits. I follow my discussion of Apprendi with an explanation of the
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analysis that a court must employ when considering whether or not to
apply a case retroactively on collateral review.
I further note that what is interesting about this question is not
that every regional circuit court of appeals has ruled that Apprendi
should not be applied retroactively on collateral review, but rather
that in so doing, none of those courts made a floodgates argument.
I conclude this Comment with an explanation of how a judge
might go about making the floodgates argument in one of those cases
if she were to take my "rule" and its "exceptions" into account. I ar-
gue that the complexity of considering caseload implications in light
of murky statutory intent counsels in favor of leaving the floodgates
out of federal court decisions.
I. THE FLOODGATES ARGUMENT
This Part discusses the "floodgates of litigation" argument and
some of its uses. The floodgates argument is one of judicial econ-
omy. Nonetheless, it can be distinguished from the usual arguments
in favor of judicial economy and efficiency, since it is an argument
that a specific result will cause such a high amount of litigation that
the efficacy of the federal courts would be severely threatened. The
argument recurs in cases where a particular ruling would provide an
incentive or a vehicle for future plaintiffs to bring federal court law-
suits where none previously existed.
A. Judicial Economy
The "floodgates of litigation" argument asserts that a proposed
ruling, "if adopted, will inundate the court with lawsuits."' The ar-
gument appears in numerous situations, such as when a "proposed
rule is confusing, overly broad, or the problem it addresses is ex-
tremely common," so that its adoption "would overwhelm the courts
and lead to inefficient use of the courts' valuable time and re-
sources."" Judge Posner has characterized this argument as a "func-
tional" type of "prudential self-restraint.'02  According to Posner's
definition, the argument "is based on [a] recognition that decisions
10 Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62
MONT. L. REV. 59, 73 (2001); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (abr. 7th ed. 2000) (defining
a floodgate as a "restraint that prevents a release of a [usually] undesirable result <the new law
opened the floodgates of litigation>").
11 Margolis, supra note 10, at 73.
12 POSNER, supra note 1 at 315; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 207-08 (1985) [hereinafter POSNER, CRISIS] (discussing a theory of judicial self-
restraint); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1983)
[hereinafter Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint] (same).
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that create rights lead to heavier caseloads which can in turn impair
the courts' ability to function (hence the word 'functional').' 3
Essentially, then, the floodgates argument is an argument in favor
ofjudicial economy.14 It is important, however, to distinguish general
arguments in favor of judicial economy from specific floodgates-type
arguments. An example of a general judicial economy argument can
be found injustice Brennan's majority opinion in United Mine Workers
of America v. GibbsY5 In Gibbs, the Court affirmed the practice of pen-
dent jurisdiction, 6 whereby a federal court was permitted to hear a
plaintiff's state law claims insofar as they arose out of the same
"common nucleus of operative fact" such that they formed the same
case or controversy.17 The Court noted that the rule's 'Justification"
lay, among other places, "in considerations ofjudicial economy."'8
The Gibbs Court's consideration ofjudicial economy simply sought
to promote an efficient judiciary. It reasoned that if a single case
were comprised of both federal and state claims arising out of the
same events, a judge should not automatically be barred from hear-
ing them all at once. The judicial economy approach can be con-
trasted with a floodgates argument; the floodgates argument goes
much further. It asserts not that it would be more efficient to adopt
one rule or interpretation over another, but rather that adopting a
particular rule or interpretation will lead to such a deluge of litiga-
tion as to make the entire court system inefficient on a much more
serious scale.'9 This Comment is concerned only with the floodgates-
type arguments, not more basic judicial economy arguments, such as
a court's consideration of how a judge-made rule might improve the
20efficiency of a court system.
13 Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 11.
14 Judicial economy may be fairly characterized as a promotion of efficiency in the court sys-
tem. Angela Moffitt explains:
The term "judicial economy" may be broadly defined as the propensity of the court to
settle as many claims as possible in one litigation. This is done to avoid the circuity of
litigation likely to result by a defendant bringing a subsequent, independent action aris-
ing out of the same claim sued upon by plaintiff.
AngelaJ. Moffitt, Project, Special Project on Landlord-Tenant Law in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals: A Tenant's Right to Counterclaim for a Period Predating Landlord's Claim, 29 HOW. LJ. 41,
44 n.25 (1986)
15 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
16 This practice (along with its cousin, ancillary jurisdiction) is now codified as supplemental
jurisdiction, at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
17 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
18 Id. at 726.
19 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (characterizing floodgates arguments).
20 See infra Part III.C.5 for a discussion of the application of the floodgates argument to
situations that call forjudge-madc doctrines.
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B. Historical and Modern Uses
The earliest known case in the United States to explicitly discuss
the floodgates argument is Delabigarre v. Bush.2' In that case, one of
the attorneys argued that allowing the forced sale of an entire parcel
of mortgaged property to pay off a debt that amounted to less than
the total property value would avoid costly litigation disputing the ex-
act costs and parcels to be sold. In response, opposing counsel
claimed that such a view, "instead of preventing suits, would only
serve to open wider the flood-gates of litigation.
"
2
The earliest known case in which a court made such an argument
is Whitbeck v. Cook.25 In Whitbeck, the Supreme Court of Judicature of
New York considered whether a landowner could sue the grantor of
land for a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when the nui-
sance-a public road-was a permanent and obvious part of the par-
cel.24 In granting the defendant's demurrer, the court noted that if
the plaintiff's action were allowed, "a flood-gate of litigation would be
opened, and for many years to come, this kind of action would
abound."
2 5
The argument takes the same form in more recent cases and
arises frequently in several areas of law. The first is tort suits in
which the plaintiff urges the court to recognize a new cause of action
or tort.2 7 The classic statement regarding torts was then-Chief Judge
Cardozo's fear of the litigation that might arise from exposing defen-
dants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class."
28
Another area of law in which floodgates arguments are often
found is that of "next friend" suits. A next friend is "a person who
appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an incompetent or minor
plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointed as
21 2Johns. 490 (N.Y. 1807).
22 Id. at 502.
23 15Johns. 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
24 Id. at 490-91.
25 Id. at 490.
26 See supra note 4 and accompanying text for examples of recent uses of the floodgates ar-
gument.
27 See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (arguing
that recognizing a right to privacy would "necessarily result not only in a vast amount of litiga-
tion, but in litigation bordering upon the absurd"); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the floodgates arguments lev-
eled against the recognition of causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
28 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). A majority of these cases are
in the state courts. But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 430 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing in a federal tort suit that the
Court's decision "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal cases").
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a guardian., 29  Floodgates arguments abound in these suits because
the question is often whether the next friend should be allowed to
30bring the suit despite not being appointed by the court. In 1990,
the Supreme Court announced in Whitmore v. Arkansas that a next
friend "must have some significant relationship with the real party in
interest, "  but did not provide any guidance on how to determine
whether a potential next friend meets that requirement.1
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a public defender could file a next friend suit against
the United States Government on behalf of a U.S. citizen who was be-
ing detained as an "enemy combatant" without an attorney.3 3  The
court held that the public defender was not a suitable next friend be-
cause he did not have a "significant, preexisting relationship with the
real party in interest."04 The court reasoned, "If we were to grant a
supposed next friend access to federal court in the absence of such a
relationship, we could be opening the floodgates of federal litigation
to the very 'intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next
friends.'"
Hamdi cites a Seventh Circuit case interpreting the Whitmore stan-
dard, in which the court held (in a decision by then-Chief Judge Pos-
ner) that a next friend seeking to represent a child must be either a




The court reasoned that standing doctrines in place were meant to
ensure that a litigant had more than a mere ideological interest in
the case-that is, that a litigant had a "concrete stake" therein. 37 The
court explained that without such a limitation, "the federal courts
[would] be flooded by 'cause' suits (really flooded) .
29 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 854 (abr. 7th ed. 2000).
30 A lawyer appointed by the court to represent an incompetent or minor party is a guardian
ad litem. See id. at 566 (defining guardian ad litem as a party "appointed by the court to appear in
a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party").
:1 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990).
2 The indeterminacy of a test based on a finding of a "significant relationship" encourages
judicial discretion, which in turn increases the likelihood that an opinion will contain the
floodgates argument, since a less legally straightforward case is more likely to discuss policy jus-
tifications.
33 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002).
34 Id. at 605. The court did rule, however, that Mr. Hamdi's father was in fact a proper next
friend. On appeal of the remanded case, the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Hamdi's detention
without charges or access to an attorney was lawful. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th
Cir. 2003); see also Tom Jackman, Judges Uphold US. Detention of Hamdi, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002,
at Al.
35 Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 605 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990)).
36 T.W. ex rel. Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.).
37 Id. at 896.
M Id.
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Another set of cases in which the floodgates argument recurs are
those involving the enforcement of the antitrust laws under Section 4
of the Clayton Act.3 9 Floodgates arguments are particularly applicable
to Section 4 cases. That statute mandates treble damages and attor-
neys' fees to a successful antitrust litigant,40 providing an incentive for
41someone with a marginal claim to sue.
For example, in Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered "the
question whether one who is not a 'target' of an alleged antitrust
conspiracy has standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act., 42 In answering
the question in the negative, the court argued against opening the
floodgates to "every creditor, stockholder, employee, subcontractor,
or supplier of goods and services that might be affected."4 Specifi-
cally, the court claimed that "the lure of a treble recovery, imple-
mented by the availability of the class suit... would result in an over-
kill." 44 The dissenting judge, however, held fast to his view of the
relevant Supreme Court precedents, claiming that the Court "has
constantly recognized that antitrust laws should be given the broadest
and most liberal interpretation in order to effectuate Congressional
intent."
4
A similar situation arose in In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation.4
In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that a fired and blacklisted gas
worker was not entitled to bring a private treble damages suit against
his employer under Section 4.47 The court echoed the fear expressed
in Calderone (and cited the language quoted from Calderone above),
claiming that "[u]nless § 4's phrase 'by reason of' is interpreted to
require a direct causal link between the antitrust violation and the re-
sulting injury, the courts would be flooded with antitrust litigation.
Thus the floodgates argument can appear in many types of cases,
but tends to recur in those cases where a litigant seeks to establish a
39 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1997).
40 Id. (requiring "threefold the damages" for antitrust violations).
41 Floodgates arguments often appear in other areas of law that involve treble damages, such
as litigation under the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") or qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 565 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the floodgates with regard to RICO
litigation); United States ex rel. Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509, 1514 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Magill,J., dissenting) (invoking floodgates argument in a qui tam case).
42 454 F.2d 1292, 1293 (2d Cir. 1971).
3 Id. at 1295.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1301 (dissenting opinion). Whether the floodgates argument is consistent with a
statute's purpose is discussed infra at Part III.A.3.
46 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
47 Id. at 520.
48 Id. at 519.
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new right or cause of action. 49 At the appellate level, it is as likely to
be found in dissenting opinions as it is in those of the majority.
II. THE CASELOAD EXPLOSION AND THE NEED FORJUDICIAL ECONOMY
The floodgates argument is attractive because the federal courts
are heavily burdened with constantly full dockets. This Part describes
the rise in federal caseloads over the past forty years and explains
some of the sources of this increase. This Part then proceeds to a
discussion of the effects that this rise in caseload has had on the
courts and judging. It concludes with a consideration of Judge Pos-
ner's thoughts on the question that this Comment answers in the
negative: whether it is appropriate for federal court judges to take
caseload considerations into account when deciding substantive is-
sues of law.
A. The Explosion
In 1960, there were 79,200 cases filed in the United States district
courts and 3,765 appeals filed in the United States courts of appeals. 5°
In 1995, the number of filings rose, respectively, to 283,688 and
49,625.5' This section focuses on this so-called "litigation explosion",
2
that has occurred over the last forty years, and more specifically con-
siders how this "explosion" affects the analysis of the floodgates ar-
gument. While arguments in favor of judicial economy have always
made sense, 3 the rise in litigation and its effects on the judiciary 4
have made such arguments particularly pertinent. The summary of
the caseload rise in the federal courts in this chapter is relatively
49 Naturally, cases in which a court must quite literally decide whether or not to allow a new
right or imply a private cause of action under a statute frequently contain floodgates arguments.
See, e.g., Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1070 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (advancing the floodgates argument in criticizing implied dam-
ages actions under the Constitution). Such cases are considered more explicitly infra at Part
III.C.3.
50 POSNER, supra note 1, at57 tbl.3.1.
51 Id. at 60-61 tbl.3.2.
52 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting Macklin Fleming, Court Survival in the Litiga-
tion Explosion, 54JUDICATURE 109 (1970)).
53 After all, the practice of pendent jurisdiction predates the so-called "explosion." See supra
notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 124-89 (describing effects of rapid caseload growth on the
federal courts). The reader should note that POSNER, supra note 1 is technically an update of
POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12. Thus, in many sections, the books are nearly identical. While
there will certainly be citations to Crisis and Reform in this section, most of the relevant statistics
will come from Challenge and Reform, since it includes over a decade's worth of additional data.
In this section and others, the reader should assume that a single citation to Challenge and Re-
form means that either the cited material is new to that edition, or the analogous passage in Cri-
sis and Reform is not materially different.
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brief,55 as is the description of the effects of the caseload rise on the
process and quality of federal judging.56 Both areas are too expansive
to cover in detail here.57  What is relevant to this discussion is that
there has been a rise in caseload that has had a tangible effect on ju-
dicial reasoning.
Federal caseloads began to rise around 1960. The rise was so
acute that some commentators wondered if it would be a metaphori-
58cal monkey wrench in the wheels of justice. In fact, Judge Posner
authored a 1983 article with the tongue-in-cheek title, Will the Federal
Courts of Appeals Survive until 1984 ? 59 Whether the situation was truly
dire or not is a matter of opinion, 0 but the rise in federal court litiga-
tion over the past forty years is undeniable.
Nonetheless, the rate of increase has leveled off,62 especially in the
Supreme Court and district courts. 3 While the caseload in the courts
5 There is a good deal of scholarship on the rise in federal court litigation in the late twen-
tieth century. A useful starting point for any interested reader is Judge Posner's Federal Courts
series. See POSNER, supra note 1, and POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12. Footnote 6 on pages 58-59
in POSNER, supra note 1, references several useful sources. See also Paul D. Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 542 (1969) (describing the effects of the rise in caseloads in the federal courts of ap-
peals); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV.
3 (discussing the effects of caseload pressures on federal judges). But see Galanter, supra note 9
(refuting the existence of a caseload crisis).
56 As with the issue of caseload in general, Judge Posner's Federal Courts series provide a use-
ful starting point. See supra note 55.
57 The brief treatment of the effects of the caseload rise on the federal courts should not be
seen as a minimization of their importance.
58 Hence Judge Posner's subtitle, "Crisis and Reform" (emphasis added). POSNER, CRISIS,
supra note 12.
59 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delega-
tion and Specialization of theJudicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761 (1983) (noting that the
title is "frivolous," and based on ANDREI AMAL'RIK, WILL THE SOVIET UNION SURVIVE UNTIL
1984? (1970)).
60 Compare Galanter, supra note 9, with POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12 (suggesting different
effects of heavy caseloads on the federal courts).
61 See, e.g., POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 59-86 (demonstrating a rise in caseloads).
62 One factor that has aided the leveling off is the passing of two statutes that serve to drasti-
cally decrease the availability of legal remedies to federal prisoners. See Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (refining federal habeas corpus stat-
utes to reduce the number of situations in which a prisoner could challenge his unlawful deten-
tion based on constitutional error at the trial court level); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000)) (impos-
ing limiting requirements on prisoner suits).
63 See POSNER, supra note 1, at xiii (describing changes in the federal court caseload from
1982 to 1995). Posner's observations on the Supreme Court presumably regard the number of
certiorari petitions filed. It should be noted, though, that over the last twenty years the number
of Supreme Court decisions on the merits has steadily fallen. Id. at 80-81 tbl.3.9.
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of appeals has continued its ascent, it grows at a lower rate than in
previous years.64
B. Causes of the Rise in Caseloads
This rise in litigation is attributable to many sources. First, the
United States population has grown since 1960," from about 179 mil-
lion people in that year 66 to about 281 million in 2000,67 roughly a
fifty-seven percent increase. Naturally, this is not enough to account
for the caseload rise on its own-after all, the caseload of the courts
of appeals rose more than thirteen-fold from 1960 to 199568
Second, there have been congressional sources of the rise in
caseloads. Since 1960, Congress has passed two laws-Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196469 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 7-that have created civil remedies available to private
parties for emloyment discrimination that are enforceable in the
federal courts. Furthermore, in addition to other statutes creating
private rights of action,72 federal regulation has grown in the late
73twentieth century, which has created additional rights of action.
Third, there are, of course, the courts themselves. The Warren
Court "enormously enlarged the number of rights upon which a suit
in federal court could be founded and... strengthened their en-
forcement., 74 That Court also gave new readings to two key statutes-
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 7' and the Ku Klux Klan Act of
See id. at 60-61 tbl.3.2.
65 Like many scholars, Posner uses 1960 as the starting point for the growth in the federal
caseload. Obviously, the rise did not begin on January 1, 1960, but it seems clear that
"[a]lthough the change in the rate of caseload growth cannot be pinpointed to 1960, it is ap-
parent that the period 1958-1962, of which 1960 is the midpoint, represents a sharp turning
point." POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 65.
66 U.S. Census Bureau, Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 1790 to
1990, tbl.2, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html (Aug. 26,
1993).
67 U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts: USA (2002), at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last revisedJuly 15, 2003).
See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
r9 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
70 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-634 (2000).
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 98 (describing the creation of new federal rights which in-
creased the number of potential claims).
72 See id. at 98 n.18 (listing examples of such statutes).
73 See Thomas M. Susman, Now More Than Ever: Reauthorizing the Administrative Conference,
Reforming Regulation, and Reinventing Government, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 677, 680 (1994) (discuss-
ing federal regulatory statistics).
74 POSNER, supra note 1, at 99.
75 Now codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (2000). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953) (allowing full relitigation of state claims on habeas corpus review).
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1871 76 -that gave rise to a vast number of federal suits. Although the
Burger Court was generally less eager to allow additional litigation,
it created additional judicial remedies, such as those for constitu-
78tional violations by federal officers.
Finally, there is another set of causes for the rise in federal court
litigation, such as a lower inflation-ad)justed amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction, 9 a relaxation of justiciability
doctrines,8 0 and a drop in the cost of legal services and an increase in
their availability."
C. Effects of the Caseload Rise in the Federal Courts
There are myriad effects of the rise in litigation over the past forty
years. This section considers some of the effects that the caseload rise
has had on federal judges and their work.
In analyzing the results of a survey sent to federal judges by the
Federal Courts Study Committee,2 Lauren Robel found that court of
appeals judges increasingly were doing away with oral arguments be-
cause their dockets were so crowded. Furthermore, Robel found
that some appellate judges' adaptations to their caseloads had limited
their contact with litigants and attorneys.84 In response to their
crowded dockets, judges indicated that they increasingly relied on
unpublished, nonprecedential opinions. 5 Nonprecedential opinions
have the potential to undermine the judicial process in that they re-
duce the opportunity for outside scrutiny and peer review from other
judges.86 The survey responses revealed also that many judges simply
do not have the time to reflect on their own work or read preceden-
76 Now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(holding that § 1983 suits are valid even if the constitutional tort was performed in violation of
state law).
77 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (formulating a restrictive test that habeas
corpus litigants must pass in order to overcome state procedural defaults).
78 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389-
98 (1971) (allowing damages suits against federal officers for constitutional violations). Natu-
rall ., this result led to a significant number of suits, known as Bivens actions.
See POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 77-87.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4644, 4644 (1988)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1989)) (creating the Federal Courts Study Committee).
83 Robel, supra note 55, at 56.
8 Id.
85 Id. In the thirteen years since that survey, however, the pendulum of publishing has be-
gun to swing in the opposite direction. See, e.g., Howard J. Bashman, Steps Taken to End Non-
Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Phila.), Jan. 13, 2003, at 5 (de-
scribing the "incremental" progress towards eliminating use of nonprecedential opinions in the
federal courts).
86 Robel, supra note 55, at 56.
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tial opinions from their circuit, and in some cases, the Supreme
Court.' Robel found also that district court judges had increased
their involvement in case management in order to dispose of more
cases in a smaller amount of time."' This increased case management
included time-saving tactics like encouraging settlement, 9 limiting
discovery,0 using pretrial conferences to guide the litigation,9' and
increasing reliance on magistrate judges to handle pretrial matters.92
These changes do not necessarily have a detrimental effect on the ju-
diciary. This Part is meant only to establish that the rising federal
caseload has had tangible effects on judges' behavior.
Judge Posner has considered the effects of the caseload rise on
federal judges (especially federal appellate judges such as himself) . 9
In addition to those topics discussed in the preceding paragraph,
94
Posner has long been wary of judicial reliance on law clerks to main-
tain a proper level of functioning. Posner notes that the increased
reliance on law clerks has pushed judges more into the position of an
editor rather than that of a writer.96 Posner argues that this reliance,
especially at the appellate level, has had several neiative effects: (1)
judges' increasing lack of recognizable writing style, (2) increases in
opinion lengths,; (3) less likelihood that judges will recognize that
they are presented with a novel case,99 (4) less expansive research,9 00
(5) lower credibility,'l1 and (6) a lack ofjudicial "greatness..102 Posner
notes also an increased trend in appellate court jurisprudence toward
"ruledness"-that is, finding explicit, more easily implemented rules
as opposed to more elastic interpretations of vague constitutional
87 Id. at 57. As a result, these tasks are often delegated to law clerks. For Judge Posner's
criticism of reliance on law clerks, see infra text accompanying notes 96-103.
88 Robel, supra note 55, at 12.
89 Id. at 16-17.
90 
Id. at 13-14.
91 Id. at 16.
92 Id. at 34-36.
93 SeePOSNER, supra note 1, at 124-89.
94 See id. at 160-83 (discussing federal appellate judges' increased reliance on unpublished
opinions and the decrease in appellate oral arguments).
95 See id. at 139-59 (stating that the increased number of law clerks per judge leads to a
greater delegation ofjudicial responsibility); see also Posner, supra note 59, at 767-75.
96 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 139-59. The judge-as-editor is meant to be contrasted with
judges like Posner who write their opinions from scratch.
See id. at 145-46.
98 See id. at 146-47.
99 See id. at 147-48 (calling this a lack of"candor").
100 See id. at 148 (claiming that because clerks must now spend more time drafting opinions,
they have less time to do research on those opinions and for the judge).
101 See id. at 148-49 (noting that an opinion not expressing ajudge's thinking will be seen by
practitioners as less authoritative for future decisions).
102 See id. at 149-51 (arguing that ajudge who simply serves as an editor to his law clerks can-
not be a "great"judge-one who leaves the bench having made a profound mark on the law).
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doctrines. 103 Finally, Posner argues that the "least visible but probably
most important way in which the pressure of a growing caseload has
resulted in streamlining or corner cutting" is the "redefinition of the
standards for granting summary judgment and for dismissing a com-
plaint for failure to state a claim" in the district courts."' He suggests
that these standards have been "watered down,o-' such that "[t]he
tendency, though it is only that, is to make summary judgment a sub-
stitute for trial, and judgment on the pleadings a substitute for sum-
mary judgment."
0 6
Thus, while the rise in federal caseload appears to be leveling
off, 0 7 the future of the federal court caseloads remains in a "setting of
profound uncertainty."
s0 8
D. Caseload andJudicial Economy
The previous three sections raise the question this Comment seeks
to answer: when (if ever) is it appropriate for a judge to explicitly
rule, at least in part, based on caseload-related judicial economy con-
siderations, namely floodgates concerns?
Part III of this Comment will answer that question in the negative
(although some exceptions are discussed).
First, however, it is useful to consider the work of other commen-
tators on this precise question. Analysis on this point is scarce.
Nonetheless, Judge Posner has considered the question not once, but
three times. In 1983, Posner first considered the question in an Indi-
ana Law Journal article.1°9 He then incorporated that article into a
chapter in the first edition of The Federal Courts."0 Finally, over a dec-
ade later, Posner updated The Federal Courts, including the section in
question."' The three versions offer three similar, but ultimately var-
ied, positions and suggestions about this question. They are consid-
ered in chronological order.
103 Id. at 177-78.
104 Id. at 178.
105 Id. at 179.
106 Id. at 180.
107 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Cf POSNER, supra note 1, at 123 ("[B]oth eco-
nomic theory and past experience teach that a continued increase in federal caseloads is not
inevitable or an actual decline in those caseloads impossible.").
108 POSNER, supra note 1, at 123.
109 Posner,Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 10-11.
110 POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 207-08.
III POSNER, supra note 1, at 314-15.
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1. 1983
In The Meaning ofJudicial Self-Restraint, Judge Posner sought to cre-
ate a taxonomy of "judicial self-restraint." 12 One type of judicial self-
restraint Posner discussed was "prudential self-restraint," which he
defined by way of a judge whose "decisions are influenced by a
concern lest promiscuous judicial creation of rights result in so
swamping the courts in litigation that they cannot function effec-
tively. 113 Posner further refines this definition, noting that one of the
two types of prudential self-restraint is "functional."' He states that
functional self-restraint "is based on recognition that decisions that
create rights lead to heavier caseloads which can in turn impair the
courts' ability to function (hence the word 'functional').'" 5
With this in mind, Posner cites his previous work 6 for the propo-
sition that if the solution to the caseload crisis is to continually add
judges, the judiciary will consequentially function less effectively.
1 7
He then admits that "[a]n interesting (and in light of the present
overload of the federal system, an urgent) question.., is whether it is
legitimate for a judge to consider caseload effects when deciding a
case. Posner asserts that the practice certainly is acceptable in
cases involving 'Jurisdiction and procedure."119 These include issues
such as standing to sue, a consideration of where judicial review of
administrative action lies in the first instance, the scope of pendent
(now supplemental) 20 jurisdiction, and "whether a federal court
should abstain when a parallel suit is pending in state court."
12'
Judge Posner is sure to note that such considerations only come
into play when "the answer is not dictated by precedent"2 2 and that
the consideration of judicial economy "will be weightier the heavier
1 Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 10 (detailing the varieties of judicial self-
restraint).
1s Id. at 10.
11 Id. at 11.
115 Id.
116 Posner, supra note 59.
7 Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 11 ("[B]eyond some point, increasing the
number ofjudges in a court system will only make the system work less well."). I do not pass on
the relative truth of this proposition, as it is beyond the scope of this Comment. I suspect that
Judge Posner and I have somewhat different views on where the benefit/detraction line lies for




120 See supra note 16 (discussing supplemental jurisdiction as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
:21 Posner,Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 11.
122 Id.
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the caseload is.' 23 Finally, he notes that if he is granted his earlier
proposition about adding new judges,2 4 then a failure to consider
caseload in the situations delineated above risks the imposition of
"substantial social costs in the form of reduced judicial quality."2 5
That, he concludes, "is a legitimate consideration in any area of law






With the exception of some minor wording changes, Posner's ad-
aptation of the above section into The Federal Courts leaves the original
intact.2 2 There is one notable difference: Posner creeps closer to an-
swering the question of whether caseloads should be considered in
deciding cases. Whereas in his 1983 paper Posner simply explained
his views on procedure and jurisdiction, here he adds a parenthetical.
Thus, on the question of "whether a judge legitimately may consider
caseload effects when deciding a case," the 1985 response is, "[h]e
surely may in areas such as jurisdiction and procedure where judicial
economy is an accepted factor in judicial decision making (and, at
least in close cases, I should think, in other areas as well)."
28
3. 1996
Eleven years later, in updating The Federal Courts,'9 Judge Posner
finally begins to look at the question beyond the scope of procedural
and jurisdictional matters.'30 First, Posner incorporates his 1983 and
1985 work in essentially the same form; the one notable difference is
that the essential "caseload" question has been transformed into the
speculation that begins this Comment. 3' In the 1996 version, Posner
123 Id. To be sure, judicial economy concerns encompass more than an increased caseload,
although caseload concerns are certainly a component thereof.
24 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (citing Posner's discussion of the effects of
caseload increases on the functioning of the federal courts).
125 Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, supra note 12, at 11.
126 Id.
127 Compare id. at 10-11 (defining functional prudential self-restraint as restraint "based on
recognition that decisions that create rights lead to heavier caseloads which can in turn impair
the courts' ability to function"), with POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 208 (defining functional
prudential self-restraint as restraint "based on recognition that decisions that create rights result
in heavier caseloads, which can in turn impair the courts' ability to function") (emphasis
added).
128 POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 208 (emphasis added).
1 See supra note 54 (discussing the different versions ofJudge Posner's Federal Courtsseries).
10 POSNER, supra note 1, at 315-18 (expanding the discussion to include "problematic"
cases).
131 See supra text accompanying note I ("Today's caseloads make it a question of some mo-
ment whether judges legitimately may consider caseload effects when deciding a case.").
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more candidly considers this question. He notes that a "problematic
case" is one in which "substantive doctrines... have substantial im-
plications for caseload."
1 3 2
As an illustration, he offers DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services,133 where the Supreme Court decided "whether
the Constitution creates a right to public services," which in that case
was specifically "a right to be protected against a physically abusive
parent," and also whether that right can be enforced in lawsuits for
damages and other relief. 1 4 As Posner notes, " [w]hatever the abstract
merits of the right asserted (and by the Supreme Court denied), the
stakes for the federal caseload were momentous," since the Court's
ruling could lead to a situation in which after every serious accident a
disgruntled survivor or relative could bring suit in federal court
against the rescue workers on the scene. Although the Court did
not rule in that manner, Posner admits that had the Court decided
the case differently, the lower courts would have developed limiting
doctrines, but the transition would still have left the caseload at a
"substantially higher" plateau.3 6
Posner continues, noting that "[o]ne could take the position that
it is not the business of the judiciary to worry about the infrastructure
of rights enforcement; that the responsibility lies elsewhere, with
Congress and the President" and that those branches "supported ju-
dicial expansion to the point necessary to accommodate new
rights.',3 7 But he responds to such a position:
The danger is not that the judiciary may be starved for resources but that
it will expand so promiscuously, and be stretched so thin, that its effec-
tiveness will be compromised. It is as irresponsible of judges as it is of
scholars to ignore the effects of creating new rights on the ability of the
federal courts to protect the holders of old rights. The issue has been ig-
nored in part because few judges or law professors take any interest in
the causes or consequences of heavy caseloads.138
Posner explains that "[i]n the heyday of legal doctrinalism judges
freely invoked fears of opening the 'floodgates' to litigation, but this
concern was seen as a thin excuse for not wanting to create new
132 POSNER, supra note 1, at 315.
13 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 208-09 (1995) (dis-
cussing David Strauss's criticism of the Supreme Court decision in DeShaney for protecting gov-
ernment employees from suit and not offering society an additional right of action).
134 POSNER, supra note 1, at 315.
135 Id. at 315-16.
136 Id. at 316.
137 Id. at 316-17.
138 Id. at 317.
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rights, since the judges knew nothing about the actual capacity of the
judicial system, which was actually underutilized."'3 '
With those "thin excuse[s]" in mind, Judge Posner admits "to
misgivings about the mingling of caseload and substantive con-
cerns."40  He compares some courts' practice of skipping legislative
history analyses in order to get through cases faster to the problems
regarding summary judgment and motions to dismiss discussed ear-
lier.14 ' Posner concludes with a self-aware challenge:
Someone has to consider the tradeoff between caseload and substance, but
perhaps the judges do not have the requisite knowledge and powers for
this task and would compromise the perceived legitimacy of their role if
they undertook it other than in the cases in which 'judicial economy" is
already a recognized factor in the formulation or application of legal
doctrine.
4 2
In Part III, this Comment seeks to meet that challenge and con-
sider whether the consideration of the floodgates, even in the types of
casesJudge Posner mentions, is proper.
III. MEETING POSNER'S CHALLENGE: THE CASE AGAINST THE
FLOODGATES
The argument against judges ruling based on fears that their deci-
sion will open the floodgates of litigation in federal court proceeds
on two grounds: first, the floodgates argument represents a value-
caseload-based judicial economy-that is simply not considered in
the Constitution and thus ruling on its basis should not be assumed
to effectuate the purpose of the judiciary as delineated in Article
III. 143 As such, doing so violates the Constitution's separation of pow-
ers. Furthermore, in statutory interpretation cases, the argument
improperly imputes a desire to limit caseloads onto Congress and
across Congresses. 144 Second, the floodgates argument has structural
problems: it fosters inconsistencies between judges, usually has no
explicit factual basis, is ancillary to the central holding of a case, and
has a high potential for misuse.
The rule against using the floodgates argument has at least five
exceptions. The first two permit the floodgates argument when
caseload considerations serve to advance the statutory purpose or to
avoid the frustration of legislative intent (when interpreting stat-
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. For the summary judgment issues, see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
142 POSNER, supra note 1, at 317-18.
143 See infra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
144 See infra Part III.A.3.
145 See infra Part III.B.
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utes) 246 The third authorizes the use of the argument when a ruling
has the potential to end the judiciary as we know it-that is, to bring
with it a deluge of litigation that literally slows the courts to a halt. '
The fourth exception is a recognition that a desire to limit multitudi-
nous litigation need not always be predicated on easing the caseload
burden on the federal courts. 148 Finally, the last exception acknowl-
edges that in a situation where a judge is truly left without authority
to guide her, then pragmatic, efficiency-based policy arguments are
acceptable. 49
Nothing described below is intended as fodder for any enforce-
able rule-that is, the argument is not that Congress should enact a
bill based on Part III of this Comment. Rather, it is intended to be a
critique of the vast majority of floodgates-style arguments. A reason-
able goal for this Part would be that it could function as a dissent in a
case in which the majority decided the case wholly on the basis of fear
of the floodgates of litigation."0
Finally, the rule offered in this section, through its exceptions, has




A. Article III, Separation of Powers, and Congressional Intent
1. Limited Jurisdiction, Not Limited Number
The constitutional case against the "floodgates of litigation" ar-
gument is simple: the desire to limit the caseload of the federal
courts is nowhere mentioned or implied in Article III of the Constitu-
tion. Since many constitutional scholars have covered the history and
structure of the federal judiciary in detail, 2 any references here
should be assumed to be somewhat simplified.
146 See infra Parts III.C.I and III.C.2.
147 See infra Part III.C.3.
148 See infra Part III.C.4.
149 See infra Part III.C.5.
0 1 know of no such case. Cf infra text accompanying notes 202-03 (demonstrating how the
floodgates argument may often be ancillary to the central holding of a case). That said, deci-
sions have been attacked as pretext for floodgates considerations.
151 Cf James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345, 349 (1986) ("The doctrine of stare de-
cisis-even in common law adjudication-has never been viewed as an absolute bar to overrul-
ing precedent.").
152 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-280 (4th ed. 1996) (presenting a chronological collection of cases on
the nature of the federal judicial function); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
1-216, 257-348 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the constitutional and statutory limits on federal
court jurisdiction).
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It is a basic premise of constitutional interpretation that Article III
of the Constitution delineates a federal courts system of "limited ju-
risdiction."15 3  Article III vests judicial power in the Supreme Court
and in lower courts that Congress could, at its discretion, create.
Allowing the lower courts to exist at Congress's will was the result of
the so-called "Madisonian Compromise," whereby James Madison and
James Wilson found a middle ground between those at the Constitu-
tional Convention who favored a national system of lower courts and
those who preferred to leave the trial courts exclusively to the states
and have their judgments appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 5
Nonetheless, when Article III delineates the nine types of cases or
controversies that would comprise the federal jurisdiction, it specifi-
cally refers to "all Cases." 56
Thus the constitutional argument is a recognition of the grant of
federal jurisdiction in Article III: the Constitution creates a judicial
system in which all cases (or controversies) within certain subject
matters are meant to be heard, not one in which they must be heard
unless they become too numerous.
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize what Article III does not say.
It does not say that the federal courts should hear "all cases, except if
allowing other people like the plaintiff to sue would create just too
many suits," or "all cases, except those which judges deem to be too
"'157
numerous.
153 See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementa-
tion of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (1986) (discuss-
i Article III's limitations on judicial power).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
15 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 2-4. It might be said that James Madison was one of
the first to employ the floodgates argument. In arguing for a national system of lower federal
courts, he claimed that "unless inferior [federal] tribunals were dispersed throughout the Re-
public with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive
degree." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). Of course, Madison was speaking about a different court structure, and even if his ar-
gument is considered against the backdrop of today's system, his comments would surely fall
within the "total judicial failure" exception discussed infra in Part III.C.3.
156 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
J57 justice Douglas put forward a version of this argument in his concurring opinion in Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Rast, the Court refined its standing doctrine to allow a taxpayer
to file a suit seeking to enjoin the federal government from violating the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923), which had held that a citizen lacked standing to file such a suit in federal court
based solely on her status as a taxpayer. Flast did not overrule Frothingham, but rather merely
refined its approach to taxpayer standing.
Justice Douglas concurred and would have overruled Frothingham altogether. See Hast, 392
U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring). In responding to the argument that overruling Frothing-
ham would open the courts up to nearly limitless taxpayer suits, Douglas defended his approach:
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Finally, as a textualist' 5s or an originalist I' 5 would likely argue, Arti-
cle III (and the rest of the Constitution) contains no explicit mandate
to judges to control the caseload of their courts-in fact, such a
power is not even implied in the text or the structure and history
thereof.' The lack of any foundation in the text of the Constitution
or its creation differentiates the floodgates argument from other ju-
dicial policy considerations, such as comity."6'
More prudential criticisms are pertinent as well. Although today's
society is often decried as unduly litigious,16 it might be argued that
the increased reliance on the judiciary counsels its expansion, not its
limitation. As Justice Tobriner said in Dillon v. Leg,163 "the existence
of a multitude of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal
redress. 
6 4
A corollary of such a view is that a broad statement advocating a
resistance to allow a certain type of (potentially) multitudinous suits
unfairly discriminates against those with meritorious claims. Put an-
other way, "[i]t seems far better to protect the rights of the few than
to make a blanket ruling where the rights of those few are brushed
aside in the name of efficient court dockets.' ' 6- Other commentators
and judges take their criticism further. W. Page Keeton insisted that
"[i] t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even
I would certainly not wait for Congress to give its blessing to our deciding cases clearly
within our Article III jurisdiction. To wait for a sign from Congress is to allow important
constitutional questions to go undecided and personal liberty unprotected.
There need be no inundation of the federal courts if taxpayers' suits are allowed.
There is a wise judicial discretion that usually can distinguish between the frivolous ques-
tion and the substantial question, between cases ripe for decision and cases that need
prior administrative processing, and the like. When the judiciary is no longer "a great
rock" in the storm, as Lord Sankey once put it, when the courts are niggardly in the use
of their power and reach great issues only timidly and reluctantly, the force of the Con-
stitution in the life of the Nation is greatly weakened.
Id. at 111-12 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Several years later, the Court
adopted the spirit of Douglas's argument, at least as it relates to the floodgates. See United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)
("[S] tanding is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury."); cf Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998) (rejecting the idea that a litigant would
lack standing merely because his injury was "widely shared").
158 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (abr. 7th ed. 2000).
159 See id. at 902.
160 Cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733-34 (1999) (finding a basis for state sovereign im-
munity in the "structure and history" of the Constitution).
161 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (considering comity as a
policy justification for pendent jurisdiction).
162 See, e.g., Fred Smith, Mandates Don't Fit Market, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2002, at A12 (noting
"our litigious society").
163 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
'n4 Id. at 917 n.3.
165 Nancy S. McCahan, Comment, Justice Scalia's Constitutional Trinity: Originalism, Traditional-
ism and the Rule of Law as Reflected in His Dissent in O'Hare and Umbehr, 41 ST. Louis U. LJ.
1435, 1463-64 (1997).
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at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on
such grounds."'
Although they do not always state so explicitly, all of these criti-
cisms of the floodgates argument (or similar considerations) claim
that it simply lacks a proper basis in the law. Prudential as the flood-
gates argument may be in some cases, it is (at least generally) unac-
ceptable because it makes judgments about the merits of cases based
on their number, not their legal validity.
2. Separation of Powers: "A Felt Necessity" 
167
The structure and principles of the Constitution's separation of
powers forbid giving preference to manageable dockets over other-
wise cognizable legal claims. As Justice Harlan explained, concurring
in Bivens,
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days.
Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative im-
portance of classes of legally protected interests. And current limitations
upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound
constitutional principles.5
If a judge denies a cause of action in federal court on the grounds
that to allow it would allow a multitude of others, that judge is acting
outside of his or her constitutional authority and violating the separa-
tion of powers principles of the Constitution.
The problems with such a ruling inhere beyond the mere separa-
tion of powers principles to the literal separation of the powers in the
text of the Constitution. That is, Article III explicitly leaves the estab-
lishment of lower courts and jurisdictional tinkering to the legislative
branch.1 69 The Framers left it to Congress, not the courts, to delineate
the lower federal courts' subject matterjurisdiction. 170
The separation of powers argument admittedly frays when a case
is within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which is created
by Article III and not Congress. Nonetheless, the Court should not
166 KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 56.
167 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) ("For [the framers] the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a
felt necessity."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (explaining separation of
powers).
168 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Harlan,J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
169 U.S. CONST. art. Il1.
170 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 152, at 348-54 (describing congres-
sional power to control federal court jurisdiction).
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invoke the floodgates argument in its original jurisdiction cases for at
least two reasons. First, Article III mandates that the judicial power
extend to "all" of certain types of cases; it does not give the Court ex-
plicit power to limit the number of those suits it might hear. Second,
use of the floodgates argument in such a situation is prudentially
flawed. These flaws are discussed below at Part III.B.
In any event, if any governmental body is to consider caseload ef-
fects, it is the legislative branch-not the judiciary. Naturally, Con-
gress is free to consider (and given the caseload rise charted in previ-
ous sections, one might argue that it should consider) the caseloadS • 171
effects of its legislation. Consequently, Congress may restructure
the lower federal courts to better manage the massive judicial
caseload.7 7 For example, Congress could raise the federal court filing
fee or the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdic-
tion.73
Just as a court may not impose a new federal filing fee or raise the
amount in controversy requirement to control its caseload (or
achieve any other goal, for that matter), a court likewise may not con-
trol its own jurisdiction through aversion to a flood of litigation.
Since Congress can (and does) limit federal courts' caseloads
through its control over subject matter jurisdiction, when federal
judges invoke the "floodgates of litigation" argument, they impermis-
sibly usurp thejurisdictional powers reserved solely to the legislature.
3. The Floodgates and Congressional Intent
The argument against the use of the floodgates argument in statu-
tory interpretation is even simpler than its constitutional sibling, and
similar concerns underlie both arguments. 
174
Courts generally should not consider the floodgates implications
of their decisions on congressional statutes because they will be as-
suming a legislative intent that Congress may not have had. Since
there is relatively little federal common law, 17 most cases in which
171 The impropriety of implicitly imputing a view on caseload effects to Congress is consid-
ered infra in Part III.A.3.
172 See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at 193-272 (discussing legislative options for limiting
the caseload surge in the federal courts).
173 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2003) (stating the amount in controversy requirement).
174 Although the constitutional considerations discussed in the previous two sections underlie
the discussion of the floodgates and statutory interpretation, this argument is not founded ex-
plicitly in the Constitution's text.
175 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 349-84 (describing the history of federal
common law). To be sure, federal courts regularly seek to determine legislative intent. The
problem with the floodgates argument is that it presupposes legislative approval of a reduced
caseload where one may or may not have existed.
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judges might invoke the floodgates argument and contravene the
principles of separation of powers will be those interpreting statutes.
A court should not assume that Congress intended or would now
desire a reduction in litigation. For example, the interpretation of a
federal child welfare statute may require a court to decide whether a
particular party can proceed as a next friend on behalf of an endan-
gered child.'76 In deciding that issue, the court rightly may consider
whether Congress intended for the party to be able to bring the ac-
tion. In all likelihood, such a statute would ask the court to look to
the best interests of the child. It would certainly be unacceptable,
however, for the court to announce that despite what Congress might
say about the child, the action must be denied because allowing the
party to proceed as a next friend would throw open the floodgates to
a deluge of litigation.
Such an argument is unacceptable for several reasons. First, the
statute would almost surely say nothing about the caseload or general
functioning of the federal courts. As such, making a decision regard-
ing the statute's function on floodgates grounds would usurp the role
of the legislature, whose job it is to consider the caseload implications
of its legislation.'
77
Second, even if the statute contains provisions related to causes of
action, those provisions may have little to do with limiting federal
caseloads and might even encourage litigation by easing restrictions
on suits or creating a federal cause of action. One common example
of explicitly provided causes of action that do not otherwise touch on
caseload considerations is the use of "citizen suit" provisions in envi-
ronmental legislation.""
Finally, any plea to the floodgates argument without some rele-
vant statutory purpose reads into Congress's intentions a desire to
limit litigation. Since only Congress can control the bounds of fed-
eral court jurisdiction, the floodgates argument assumes that, if given
the choice, Congress would choose to limit federal court litigation.
Naturally, Congress might have a different agenda. What if the
bill's sponsor was, say, a well-known trial lawyer and plaintiffs' rights
advocate? After all, trial lawyers are a powerful lobbying group at the
176 See supra text accompanying note 29.
177 But cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.").
178 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (authorizing "any citizen" to
.commence a civil action" against "any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of" the Act);
Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (employing nearly identical language). If any in-
terpretation of these statutes were to be made regarding caseload considerations (although one
should not be made at all), it would be that these provisions are meant to encourage litigation,
not limit it.
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national level 7 ' and might have pushed passage of the bill precisely so
that it would create a rise in federal litigation.
None of this is to suggest that a judge can clearly divine an intent
to limit or encourage litigation from a bill's text or legislative history.
Much has been written about the perils of statutory interpretation,
so it should suffice to note that any apparent legislative intent to en-
courage or limit litigation may itself be a cause for disagreement.
Thus the floodgates argument suffers from severe constitutional
flaws. Judicial considerations of the caseload implications their deci-
sions are an improper usurpation of the legislature's role in control-
ling federal court jurisdiction. Furthermore, these considerations
may lead to the attribution of a caseload-limiting goal to Congress
where it may not have existed. These flaws, along with the prudential
flaws considered below,'8 ' should counsel against the use of the
floodgates argument in federal court decisions.
B. Prudence, Common Sense, and Realism
Even if the constitutional (or statutory) underpinnings of the
floodgates argument were such that it were a legitimate judicial con-
sideration under Article III, the argument itself would still be un-
sound. This subsection contemplates some basic flaws in the use and
premise of the floodgates argument that are unrelated to the consti-
tutional structure of the courts or statutory interpretation.
1. Predictability
One of the most easily identifiable problems with the floodgates
argument is that it is rarely, if ever, followed by a true analysis of the
potential litigation of which it speaks. That is, one response to a
floodgates argument might be, "Are you sure that a contrary position
would yield a flood of litigation?"
82
This criticism is frequently leveled against the floodgates argu-
ment, especially in the realm of tort litigation. For example, as onecommentator has argued:
179 See, e.g.,J. Ross Harper, Good, Bad and Ugly of the American System, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 16,
1995, at 11 (describing the Trial Lawyers Association as "one of the most powerful lobbies in
America").
[so See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, Theory and Reality in Statutory Interpretation, 15 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 1 (2002).
1s1 See supra Part Ill.B.
182 The logical follow-up question, "How much litigation is enough to constitute a flood," is
considered infra in Part Il.B.4.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing the use of floodgates arguments in
tort cases).
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The "floodgates of litigation" argument has proven wrong time and
again. The lifting of the "impact" rule in rewarding damages for mental
anguish, allowing third parties to recover under contracts, and the rec-
ognition of the right to privacy, were all prophesied to overwhelm the
courts with frivolous claims. They have not.
This argument, one should think, is relatively strong. While the
floodgates argument is generally based on policy considerations,
8 5
policy arguments are rarely so indeterminate. While moral argu-
ments are certainly not precise--one cannot quantify, say, "fairness"
or 'justice"-they are simply used differently. That is, when a judge
says that a decision "promote [s] justice,"8 6 he or she is not speaking
about a tangible, actual result. In contrast, when a judge expresses
that a decision will open the floodgates of litigation, he or she is say-
ing that there will be actual, cognizable caseload results from the de-
cision.
Given how often the floodgates do not open when we are warned
that they will,"' making the argument without a proper foundation is
dangerous. While there certainly are situations in which a judge
should consider the implications of a decision on his or her
184 Kimm Alayne Walton, Note, Kathleen KR v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital Herpes
Transmission, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 498, 534 (1984) (footnotes omitted). In Brentwood Acad-
emy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 304 (2001), Justice Souter, writing
for the Court, criticized one party's attempt at invoking the floodgates:
The Association suggests, first, that reversing the judgment here will somehow trigger an
epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation. Even if that might be counted as a good
reason for a Polk County decision to call the Association's action private, the record raises
no reason for alarm here. Save for the Sixth Circuit [in the case below], every Court of
Appeals to consider a statewide athletic association like the one here has found it a state
actor .... No one, however, has pointed to any explosion of § 1983 cases against inter-
scholastic athletic associations in the affected jurisdictions. Not to put too fine a point
on it, two District Courts in Tennessee have previously held the Association itself to be a
state actor, but there is no evident wave of litigation working its way across the State. A
reversal of the judgment here portends nothing more than the harmony of an outlying
Circuit with precedent otherwise uniform.
(internal citations omitted). A recent district court case provides another example:
Similarly unpersuasive is defendants' floodgates argument. There is no reason to believe
that allowing subrogees to aggregate subrogated claims will flood the federal courts with
such cases. Indeed, there is reason to believe the contrary since no flood has yet oc-
curred despite existing authority allowing aggregation of subrogated claims by subrogees
to meet the jurisdictional amount. In any event, Congress, as architect of diversity jurisdiction,
may act to restrict the scope of this jurisdiction by foreclosing subrogees from aggregating claims to
meet the jurisdictional amount.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hechinger Co., 982 F. Supp. 1169, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1997) (emphasis
added).
185 See infra Part III.B.2 (noting that the floodgates argument has no statutory or constitu-
tional basis). See also Margolis, supra note 10, at 72-73 (describing the floodgates argument as a
policy argument ofjudicial administration).
186 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (describing how pendent juris-
diction "promote[s] justice between the parties").
187
See supra text accompanying notes 183-84 (challenging the accuracy of the floodgates ar-
gument, especially in the context of tort actions).
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caseload, 8 doing so without considering the factual bases of those
implications is problematic.'8 9 And while uncertainty is an unavoid-
able part of the law,' 90 the language with which the floodgates argu-
ment is regularly employed expresses anything but conjecture and
uncertainty. The arguments are forceful; they are intended to con-
jure "[i] mages of a destructive, elemental force."'9' After all, as Judge
Posner notes, "So irregular has been the growth of the caseloads of
each of the three tiers of the federal judiciary in the past, and so
many and poorly understood are the causes of changes in judicial
caseloads, that it is impossible to make responsible predictions about future
changes.' 92  The failure of judges to recognize this limitation of the
argument reduces the weight afforded thereto.
2. Necessity
One interesting aspect of the floodgates argument is that it is usu-
ally ancillary to the central holding of the judicial opinions in which
it is used.9 3 Although policy arguments are often not essential to a
court's decision, '' the hope is that they usually are connected to the
18 See infra Part III.C (discussing exceptions to the rule discussed in this section).
189 This is not to say that ajudge is always unreasonable when predicting a rise in caseload. A
judge might take a reasoned look at statistical evidence to suggest that the decision would yield
a large amount of additional litigation. Furthermore, some sharp caseload increases are easily
predictable. For example, any Supreme Court constitutional rights decision made retroactive
on collateral review would lead to a number of habeas corpus challenges. See infra Part IV for a
discussion of such a case.
None of these considerations, however, change the status of the floodgates argument with
regard to the separation of powers flaws discussed infra in Parts III.A and IlI.B. Finally, al-
though there are such self-evident potential rises in caseload or opportunities for a judge to
make a strong statistical argument as to why he or she expects a rise in caseload to flow from a
particular decision, the self-evident cases are rare and the meticulous statistical arguments even
rarer.
190 See, e.g., Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1015, 1044 (1997) ("Uncertainty should not necessarily be excoriated, however, as it is not per se
an unacceptable characteristic of adjudication.").
191 Galanter, supra note 9, at 65.
192 POSNER, supra note 1, at 122 (emphasis added). Note that Posner is speaking about fed-
eral court caseloads generally, not about floodgates predictions specifically.
193 The use of "ancillary" in this section is meant to suggest that the legal bases of decisions
using the floodgates argument are independently supportable. This is not to say that a decision
could not rest solely on a floodgates justification. Courts are free to reason as they wish. None-
theless, floodgates arguments simply are not used as the sole basis for case resolution in the
federal courts. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting that there does not appear to
be a single case that was decided solely on the basis of a floodgates argument).
194 Cf United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (justifying pendent jurisdiction in
part on the policy grounds of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"). The
suggestion that floodgates arguments are nonessential is not to ignore their use. For the pur-
poses of this section, a holding that says, e.g., "Because Plaintiff v. Defendant is a clear and
controlling precedent, and because to decide otherwise would unleash a flood of litigation
upon the federal courts, we affirm," includes the floodgates argument as a nonessential
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underlying logic of the case. Thus, for example, an argument against
the floodgates might be worthy in a case interpreting a statute that
limits lawsuits, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PLRA") .19 On the other hand, expressing a fear of the floodgates
of litigation when interpreting, say, the Clayton Act, has no such con-
196nection .
This is not to suggest that judges do not actually fear a rise in
caseload. In many instances, though, the floodgates argument seems
to present itself because it has the mere potential to be true.197 Con-
sider the combination of this fact and the preceding subsection: in
the majority of cases, judges are making an ancillary claim that often
times has little, if any, factual support.
3. Legitimacy Implications
Given the implications of the previous two subsections, namely
that judges are making factual arguments that are not necessarilyjus-
tified and that those arguments are almost invariably ancillary to the
central legal holding in a case, there is a legitimate question as to the
motivation behind caseload-sensitive arguments. As Judge Posner has
explained, in considering whether judges should consider caseload as
a substantive argument, it "would compromise the perceived legiti-
macy of their role if they undertook it other than in the cases in
which 'judicial economy' is already a recognized factor in the formu-
lation or application of legal doctrine."19
Nonetheless, simply advancing the floodgates argument does not
mean that judges are eschewing proper legal analysis in order to act
in their self-interest. Rather, as Judge Posner put it, a consideration
of this argument gives one pause to question its legitimacy vis-a-vis a
court's control of its own caseload.' The caseload pressures de-
component. Although it certainly could be classified as part of the "holding," the floodgates
component of the court's reasoning is not the legal basis of the decision. (It is to be assumed
that the controlling case in that situation does not call for an analysis based on the caseload im-
plications of potential outcomes.)
195 Situations in which caseload implications and statutory or constitutional goals intersect
are discussed infra at Part III.C. See also infra text accompanying notes 217-20 (discussing the
PLRA and inferences about legislative intent).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 39-48 for examples of the floodgates argument in an-
titrust cases.
197 Cf Margolis, supra note 10, at 73 n.74 (The floodgates argument "is much overused and
often used inappropriately .... [I] t should be used selectively, and only where truly appropri-
ate.").
198 POSNER, supra note 1, at 318.
199 This is not to say that judges may not seek to maximize efficiency in the courtroom. In
fact, the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges con-
sider efficient means of justice. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(8) (1990) ("A
judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly."). But see id. at Canon
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scribed in Part II only raise the stakes when caseload considerations
are involved °. °
There are also questions of motivation. Judge Posner has noted
that prior to the rise in caseloads, when judges invoked the floodgates
argument, their "concern was seen as a thin excuse for not wanting to
create new rights, since the judges knew nothing about the actual ca-
pacity of the judicial system, which was actually underutilized., 20 1 A
dissenting opinion often will accuse a majority of ruling out of a fear
of excessive litigation. For example, in Scott v. Moore, 2 Judge Wisdom
writes for the dissenters that the "majority opinion is, regrettably, a
subterfuge to avoid opening the floodgates of litigation.
2
1
Even if they differ from the stated reasoning, judges' unstated and
often subconscious considerations cannot be controlled. Not every
judge practices what Judge Posner defines as judicial candor, namely
"admitting that the judge's personal policy preferences or values play




4. Defining a "Flood"
Although the rise in the federal caseload has started to plateau, °0
the high level of caseloads that persists bears on the federal judicial
product.2 0 6 Nonetheless, when a judge invokes the floodgates argu-
ment, he or she does not explain what differentiates this potential
flood from an acceptable rise in caseload. For example, it would
seem that most pro-plaintiff decisions would have a small but actual
effect on the overall caseload: they create a new set of facts that dic-
tate a pro-plaintiff outcome, thereby increasing the likelihood that a
3B(8) cmt. ("In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, a judge must demonstrate
due regard for the rights of the parties .... A judge should encourage and seek to facilitate
settlement, but parties should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their contro-
versy resolved by the courts."). Nevertheless, while encouraging settlement will reduce the
caseload in the federal courts, guiding litigants toward extrajudicial resolutions of their claims is
different than usingjudicial opinions to reduce the caseload once the claims are before a court.
20 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 315 (arguing that "the heavier the caseload is," the more judi-
cial economy will be weighted). It should be noted, though, that not all federal judges, busy as
they surely are, are necessarily gasping under their caseloads. See id. at 150 n.46 ("The state-
ment by Chief Judge Howard Markey ... that 'in today's appellate world, no judge has adequate
time to write every word of all his or her opinions,' ... was incorrect when written and is incor-
rect now."). In any event, whether ajudge is overburdened or not does not alter the prudential
and constitutional problems with floodgates arguments.
20 Id. at 317.
202 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
203 Id. at 57 (Wisdom,J., dissenting).
204 POSNER, supra note 1, at 331.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 (describing the leveling off of caseloads at the
district, circuit, and Supreme Court levels).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 82-106 (discussing judicial adaptations to the rise in
federal caseload and the implications of these adaptations onjudicial work product).
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potential plaintiff possessing similar facts will seek legal redress. It is
not clear, however, where a potential rise in lawsuits becomes a flood.
This is to be distinguished from other ambiguous considerations
in the law. For example, the current controlling Supreme Court
standard by which to judge legislation that restricts women's access to
abortion requires an examination of whether that restriction poses an
"undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability., 20 7
This test is, of course, inherently subjective. But what distinguishes
court-defined tests such as the undue burden test (or the probable
cause standard for evaluating Fourth Amendment claims) 09 from
floodgates-type arguments is that the court-defined tests ostensibly
have a specific basis in the law.
Whereas the undue burden test is a framework for evaluating pos-
sible violations of the constitutional right to noninterference with
one's family and parenthood decisions, 10 the floodgates argument
enjoys no such basis in the Constitution. Although floodgates deci-
sions could be more normalized following extensive appellate review,
the source of the floodgates argument will necessarily be nebulous
policy considerations, not a statute or the Constitution.2 1
Thus, one must ask what a particular decision need cause in order
to warrant prevention under a floodgates rationale. That is, how
much litigation is so much that as a matter of policy we must prevent
it? The indeterminacy of any answer to that question ties into the
problem of consistency; regardless of the validity of the argument in
the abstract, when judges use it they each have something different in
mind, which yields an inconsistent judiciary. Certainly there will be
cases that all can agree on-if a plaintiff sought a decision that re-
versed every single federal conviction in the history of the United
States, almost every single judge would recognize that the ensuing
litigation would eviscerate the court system. And surely every judge
207 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
208 Cf Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1003, 1004 (1993) ("The discretionary nature of the undue burden test renders it unworkable.
It is a standard which cannot be applied by state courts consistently, predictably, and without
prejudice.") (footnote omitted).
209 See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1975) (discussing the history of the
probable cause standard).
210 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
211 Of course, Congress could write a statute that contains a line such as, "nothing in this
statute should be construed in such a way as to encourage a flood of litigation upon the federal
courts." That the floodgates argument is acceptable in a case where a statute intends to limit
litigation (or, as here, prevent the floodgates themselves) is considered infra in Part III.C.1.
212 The potential to collapse the judiciary is an exception discussed infta in Part III.C.
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would agree that there is no floodgates issue with, say, conferring a
right of action on only a handful of citizens. 13
Those cases, however, lie at the margins. In between, in the un-
certain gray area, lies another oft-invoked policy argument: the slip-
pery slope. 14 That is, if one type of action should be blocked because
of the potential flood of litigation, how close must the next potential
flood be in order to qualify for such treatment? There can be no
question but that a flood of litigation means different things to dif-
ferent judges, and that the continued use of the phrase perpetuates
215inconsistency.
Considering the last few sections together, we are left with what
can only be viewed as a deeply flawed argument. The floodgates ar-
gument can now be characterized as an ancillary argument not usu-
ally founded in fact, which implicates a judge's motivations and is
necessarily inconsistent from judge tojudge.
C. Exceptions to the Prohibition
Although the "floodgates of litigation" argument and its uses are
deeply flawed, there are certain situations in which employing the ar-
gument is acceptable. If the previous subsection is taken as creating a
general rule against using the argument, 6 then this subsection de-
fines the exceptions to that rule.
These exceptions should be prefaced with an important qualifica-
tion: simply because the floodgates argument may avoid constitu-
tional or statutory problems in certain circumstances does not mean
that the prudential defects identified in the previous section should
not caution against using it.
1. Emphatically Saying What the Law Is
The first exception is the vaguest. It states that when a decision
calls for the interpretation of a statute, a court may consider the
floodgates insofar as avoiding additional litigation would advance the
213 For example, if a court authorized an action specific to living Civil War veterans, and
there were only five known living Civil War veterans, there would be no likelihood of any flood
of litigation.
214 See, e.g., Margolis, supra note 10, at 73 ("A slippery slope argument asserts that if the pro-
posed rule is adopted, the court will not be able to prevent its application to an ever broadening
set of cases."). For an extensive consideration of that argument, see Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
215 This is true even if one ignores that what is "too much" antitrust litigation might be an
"acceptable" amount of habeas corpus litigation, for example, or vice versa.
216 As mentioned, this Comment does not seek to create an anti-floodgates rule. See supra
text accompanying notes 150-51.
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statutory purpose. For example, the PLRA! 7 sought to reduce the
number of "frivolous lawsuits" brought by federal prisoners challeng-
ing the conditions of their confinement.2 8 The bill was passed be-
cause:
[f] rivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable le-
gal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citi-
zens. The time and money spent defending these cases are clearly time
and money better spent prosecuting violent criminals, fighting illegal
drugs, or cracking down on consumer fraud. 9
As such, if a lawsuit required a court to interpret that statute (because
it was not clear on its face), precluding a rise in prisoner litigation
might legitimately advance the purposes of the PLRA.220  Note that
this would not be so much an expression of fear for the results of
opening the floodgates as it would be a fear of reaching a result that
Congress did not intend.22'
2. Frustration of the Statute
Related to advancing a statutory purpose is a separate (but re-
lated) fear that opening the floodgates of litigation will frustrate the
purpose of a statute. An obvious example of this consideration would
arise when interpreting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") which was enacted (in part) to reduce the
number of habeas corpus petitions winding their way through the
federal court system.222 In interpreting a question regarding habeas
corpus petitions, a court must be especially mindful of the changes
that AEDPA made to the federal habeas statutes.
Thus, if a court is considering how to rule in a particular case, it
would be appropriate to narrowly interpret a provision affected by the
AEDPA changes, as to avoid giving rise to a flood of litigation.
217 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000))
(imposing limiting requirements on prisoner suits).
218 141 CONG. REc. S14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("This legislation
is... introduced. . . to address the alarming explosion in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed
by State and Federal prisoners.").
219 Id.
220 Of course, if the interpretation regarded nonfrivolous litigation, then floodgates concerns
might not further the aims underlying the statute. See supra text accompanying note 217 (dis-
cussing the goals of the PLRA). See also supra Part III.A.3 (discussing legislative intent).
221 See Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that, with regard to
the PLRA, "[i]t is well settled that Congress has a legitimate interest in deterring meritless pris-
oner litigation").
2 See generally James 0. Nygard et al., Current Developments in the Law, A Survey of Cases
Affecting the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 333 (1996)
(illustrating AEDPA's use in habeas cases).
223 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 848-49 (discussing AEDPA's narrowing the scope of
habeas corpus relief).
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Nonetheless, it is important to remember that legislation is rarely
the result of a single-minded body; it is most often the result of a se-
ries of compromises.2 2 4 These conflicts are not unique to the flood-
gates realm-they underlie all statutory interpretation. If a judge re-
viewed a statute and found the text and legislative intent to imply a
desire to limit a particular type of litigation, interpreting the statute
as to avoid an amount of litigation that would frustrate that intent is
not necessarily improper. In any event, as mentioned above, any use
of the floodgates argument will suffer several internal flaws, as dis-
cussed above in Part III.B.
3. TotalJudicial Failure
Imagine that Congress has passed an expansive law nullifying all
federal convictions and setting free all incarcerated federal prisoners.
Further imagine that Congress says little, if anything, about whether
these former prisoners can seek redress from the government in fed-
eral court. In considering whether to allow a right of action under
the statute, a court properly could (and perhaps should) consider the
caseload effects of their decision.
The Court's implied right of action jurisprudence, starting with
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, requires an inquiry into whether
there is a clear legislative intent to create a cause of action under a
particular statute. The rationale behind this approach, especially in
recent cases, is that Congress now knows that it must be clear in its
intent to allow a cause of action in order for the judiciary to recog-
nize it.26 Nonetheless, even if the legislative history of a bill were si-
lent as to an interest in limiting litigation, it might be fair to assume a
desire not to slow the federal courts down to the point at which estab-
lished causes of action, both civil and criminal, would cease to be
handled at a reasonable pace. This situation would differ from a
normal floodgates scenario, since it might be presumed that allowing
every federal convict to sue would not merely slow down the federal
courts, it would bring them to a halt.
It might be objected that such an assumption is unfair. After all,
the objector could note, Congress has the power to establish addi-
tional lower federal courts, so a judge should not be concerned with
slowing the judiciary to a near halt. That is, the separation of powers
considerations discussed above should not yield, even in the face of a
24 Portions of AEDPA itself have been interpreted as the result of legislative compromise.
See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 422-43
(1996) (describing the debate between opponents and proponents of the legislation).
25 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
22 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 382 (discussing private right of action cases).
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flood of litigation that would quite literally cripple the courts. The
objection is not without merit, but this Comment does not take such
a strong stand on the issue. It is one thing to argue against an oft-
used policy argument, it is quite another to argue that judges may as-
sume that Congress meant to flood the courts with so many suits that
even those suits would not be resolved with any speed.
In any event, the argument need not rest solely on congressional
intentions. If the previous subsection referred to statutory frustra-
tion, then this exception could be considered "constitutional frustra-
tion." That is, the Constitution may not give support to the judicial
consideration of caseload effects, 7 but Article III surely does not au-
thorize its own demise. Thus, if a particular ruling were to literally
grind the federal wheels of justice to a halt, invoking an argument
against such a ruling on the grounds that doing so would release an
untenable flood of litigation is acceptable.
To be sure, there is notable disagreement over exactly what Arti-• • • 228
cle III means with respect to establishing federal courts. Nonethe-
less, this exception to the floodgates rule is valid independently of
various scholarly interpretations of Article III. The Constitution de-
clares that "[tihe judicial power of the United States [] shall be vested
in one supreme Court. 2 2 9 Whether Congress were to establish lower
federal courts or not, surely the Framers did not intend to vest a
power in a Court only to have it be burdened to the point at which it
could no longer execute that power.
2 30
This exception, in the paradigmatic situation, avoids some of the
"common sense" problems with floodgates arguments.213 For exam-
ple, if a ruling were literally to grind the courts to a halt, such a result
would likely be apparent (and thus not in need of empirical proof).
Similarly, the dangers of inconsistency among judges would be allevi-
ated because such a situation would be so obvious that one would ex-
pect nearly every judge to recognize it. Finally, in such a situation,
the floodgates argument might serve as a court's holding (as opposed
to being ancillary to another holding).
That this exception avoids some of the prudential problems dis-
cussed earlier is desirable, since the exception would seem as consti-
tutionally necessary as the anti-floodgates rule itself. Implicit in Arti-
cle III is the assumption that the federal courts will actually
227 See supra Part III.A.
228 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 191-207 (reviewing several interpretations of
the congressional power to establish lower federal courts under Article III).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
230 The circuit courts of appeals were established at a time when "[t]he Supreme Court
docket got beyond control," and reached "the absurd total of 1800 [cases per year]." FELIX
FRANKFURTER &JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 86 (1927).
231 See supra Part III.B.
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function-if a ruling could potentially freeze litigation across the
country, considering what the Constitution says about such a result is
never undesirable.
With the wrong intentions, though, this exception easily could be
abused-a judge could overstate the dangers of litigation or simply
use a faux-floodgates argument as pretext for some other endeavor.
Nonetheless, the ability for abuse, in the abstract, is no reason to re-
ject the exception.
4. Caretaking and the Floodgates
It is permissible for a court to rule based on the potential caseload
effects of a decision when the chief consideration regarding the po-
tential caseload rise is focused on something (or someone) other than
the courts. For example, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,"2 the Supreme Court
held that the President of the United States enjoyed absolute immu-
nity from suits for money damages for acts committed while carrying
out the duties of the presidency. 33 One rationale behind this grant of
immunity (and other grants of immunity from suits under 28 U.S.C. §
1983) is that if anyone were allowed to sue the President for his ac-
tions in office, then he would be so involved with defending himself
that he could not as effectively act as President.
234
This consideration is not so much one of the floodgates, but
rather an acceptable use of caseload considerations. That is, the fear
is not that a flood of litigation will drown the courts and make them
inefficient or ineffective, but rather that a rash of lawsuits would
compromise the effectiveness of another branch of goverment.2
35
Nevertheless, the considerations involved in such a determination
suffer from some of the same prudential flaws as any other use of the
floodgates, namely the failure of judges to properly substantiate
claims about the potential flood of litigation. 36
5. Are the Floodgates Tolerable When All Else Fails?
The final exception comes from Judge Posner's three versions of
his consideration of judicial restraint. 23  Posner claims that judges
232 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
233 Id. at 751-54; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 511; FALLON ET AL., supra note 152,
at 1171.
234 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 511 (noting that "the Court emphasized the likeli-
hood of frequent suits as ajustification" for the grant of immunity).
235 But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (refusing to extend Nixon to civil suits filed
against a sitting President arising out of actions taken outside of his official capacity).
236 See supra Part III.B (discussing prudential flaws in the floodgates argument).
237 See supra Part l.D.
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can and should consider caseload implications in procedural and ju-
risdictional matters when "the answer is not dictated by precedent., 23
Posner's view is that when a court is forced to rule despite a complete
lack of guidance from precedent, the statutes at issue, or the Consti-
tution, a judge may turn to more practical considerations. 39
This exception is the most cautiously accepted of the five-no
matter how little precedent on a matter, the Constitution will always
be a guide and thus the Article III considerations and criticisms in
discussed in Part III.A above apply here. 4 What sets this situation
apart as an exception is that if there is a true lack of guidance on a
241question, then constitutional principles do not necessarily act as a
guide (although one might argue that they always inform the discus-
sion). Thus, the criticism that the Constitution in no way mandates
considering the floodgates argument in a "normal" judging situa-
tion 24 is negated by the Constitution's lack of any positive guidance
on the matter (other than to stay within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion and its amendments).
This is far from a controversial premise: if a judge truly has no
guidance, then that judge has extremely wide latitude in which to
work.
IV. THE RULE AND EXCEPTIONS IN ACTION AT THE MARGINS:
APPRENDIAND RETROACTIVITY FOR COLLATERAL REVIEW
Armed with the above rule and its exceptions, this Comment con-
cludes with a real-life example of how a more thorny case might play
out. This Part considers how the arguments from the previous Part
would apply to the question of whether the Supreme Court's decision
in Apprendi v. NewJersey43 should be applied retroactively on collateral
review. The reader should note that the following analysis focuses on
the propriety of using the floodgates argument in a particular situa-
tion, not on the substantive law at hand in that situation. More specifi-
238 POSNER, supra note 1, at 315.
239 Id.
240 See supra Part III.A.
241 One of the limitations of this exception is that whether there is guidance on a particular
question is a matter of opinion subject to genuine debate. It is difficult to imagine a situation in
which there is truly no constitutional or statutory guidance on a matter. For example, in one
recent case, the Supreme Court dealt with statutory interpretation difficulties by making infer-
ences from other statutes. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143-59
(2000) (looking to congressional statutes regulating tobacco when considering whether the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act gave the FDA jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and other to-
bacco products). A true lack of guidance, should it exist, is certainly more likely in the proce-
dural and administrative cases Posner describes. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
242 See supra Part III.A.2.
243 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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cally, this section deals with a question of law that will likely remain




In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o] ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime be-
yond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 45 This holding constituted
a drastic change in criminal sentencing procedure, as judges had
previously been entrusted to depart beyond the maximum sentence
prescribed in the relevant statute. In dissent, Justice O'Connor char-
acterized the decision as "a watershed change in constitutional law."
2 46
Soon after Apprendi, courts began to hear cases in which prisoners
challenged their pre-Apprendi sentences, arguing that Apprendi should
be applied retroactively on collateral review.2 4 ' These challenges were
unsuccessful; as Justice Thomas noted in dissent in Harris v. United
States,248 "No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that Ap-
prendi has retroactive effect."
2 49
Justice Thomas's observation remains true today, as every federal
court of appeals (except the Federal Circuit, which does not hear
such cases) has held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on col-
lateral review.50 While some district courts have held that Apprendi is
24 That the question of Apprendi's retroactivity has a relatively straightforward resolution, see
cases cited infra at note 250, makes it particularly useful for this analysis. As discussed supra in
Part IIB, the floodgates argument is usually ancillary to the central holdings of cases in which
it is involved. Here, the argument also would be ancillary, but would not necessarily be without
factual basis.
245 Id. at 490.
246 Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For an excellent review of Apprendi, its antecedents,
and the decisions that followed, see Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Ap-
prendi-land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377,
379-82, 390-415 (2002).
247 Collateral review of convictions or sentences infected with constitutional errors may be
brought in federal court through a writ of habeas corpus. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note
152, at 837-49.
248 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
249 Id. at 581 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2 5 See United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7879
(Oct. 20, 2003); Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2003); Coleman v. United
States, 329 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2003); Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1096 (2002); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1919 (2003); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 976 (2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 537 U.S.
961 (2002); In reSmith, 285 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2002), petitionfor cert. filed, (Nov. 12, 2002); United
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in fact retroactively applicable on collateral review,2 ' 1 barring a Su-
preme Court reversal of the eleven courts of appeals to consider the
issue, nonretroactivity will remain the settled interpretation.
2. A (Mostly) Straightforward Analysis
Although the focus of this section is on the applicability of the
floodgates argument to the question of whether Apprendi should be
applied retroactively on collateral review, a basic review of the rele-
vant analysis is useful. A court faced with the question of whether a
prisoner should be granted habeas corpus relief on the basis of a new
constitutional rule must employ the analytical framework deline-
ated in Teague v. Lane. Although AEDPA made many changes to
the habeas corpus statutes,21 4 Teague still controls the question of ret-
roactivity in an initial habeas petition.' 5
In Teague, a plurality of the Court55 created a framework for de-
ciding whether to allow a habeas petitioner to prevail based on a new
States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sum nom., 537 U.S. 939 (2002);
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245 (1 lth Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 906 (2002); United
States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1097 (2002); United States v.
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1032 (2001); see also In reTurner, 267 F.3d
225 (3rd Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta that Apprendi would probably not be retroactive on collat-
eral review).
251 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding
that "Apprendi applies retroactively for purposes of collateral review").
252 It is assumed in this section that the habeas corpus petition is the prisoner's first. To suc-
ceed on a second or successive motion for habeas corpus relief based on a new rule, a prisoner
must show that his claim is based on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2000). The Court recently interpreted "made" in that clause to mean "held," such that the
Supreme Court must have held that a case should be applied retroactively for a prisoner to avail
himself of that language. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001) ("[Tlhe requirement is satis-
fied only if this Court has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review."). Although courts use the floodgates argument in an ancillary manner, see supra Part
III.B.2, Apprendi (nor any subsequent Supreme Court case) did not hold its rule to be retroac-
tively applicable on collateral review. Under Tyler, this makes the second or successive petition
question not ripe for the floodgates argument. That is, it is too clear a result.
253 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion); cf Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665-67 (considering Teague
as applied to a second or successive habeas petition).
2M See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 224, at 381-422 (discussing AEDPA's effect on habeas statutes).
255 See Mora, 293 F.3d at 1218 ("Initial habeas petitions based upon a new rule of constitu-
tional law are not guided by the gatekeeping language of AEDPA, but rather are guided by the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane.") (citations omitted).
256 "Although only fourjustices fully embraced the Teague plurality opinion at the time it was
handed down, it is now accorded the full precedential weight of a majority opinion." Jones v.
Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000); see also id. (citing Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383, 389-90 (1994); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (supporting the proposition
that Teague's plurality opinion is given full precedential weight)).
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constitutional rule.2' 7 The Teague framework creates two exceptions
to a general rule of nonretroactivity.
258
The first exception allows for retroactive application of a new rule
that places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. 2 59
That is, a judicial pronouncement that certain activities cannot (con-
stitutionally) be criminalized will be applied retroactively. This ex-
ception is inapplicable to Apprendi, which constrained only New Jer-
sey's sentencing system, not its power to criminalize certain
conduct.
26 °
The second Teague exception applies when a new rule "requires
the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty., 2 Thus, a case will be retroactive if it con-
tains a "watershed" rule that "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness
of the trial."2 62 To qualify as a "watershed" rule, the new rule must
"'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essen-
tial to the fairness of a proceeding.
263
Although these terms are not unambiguous, the circuit courts of
appeals have applied this jrong uniformly to find Apprendi inapplica-
ble to collateral review. While most courts recognize Justice
O'Connor's observation, dissenting in Apprendi, that the majority's
decision in that case represented a "watershed change in constitu-
tional law, 265 they nonetheless find that its rule does not rise to the
levels that Teague's second exception demands.e
This analysis, over which the circuit courts are in agreement, 267 is
likely correct.
3. Whither the Floodgates?
Ironically, while the basis for the courts of appeals's decisions was
relatively straightforward,2 ' none of those courts invoked the flood-
257 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-13.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 307 (internal quotations omitted).
260 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474 (describing the "constitutional question" in terms of Ap-
prendi's sentence).
261 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (internal quotations omitted).
262 Id. at 312.
263 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S.
at 311).
2 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
265 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that Ap-
prendis "rule is clearly not on the same level as a truly landmark decision").
See supra note 250 (citing circuit court decisions that have mentioned the likely nonretro-
active nature of collateral review in ApprendO.
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gates argument even though a contrary decision would likely have led
to thousands of lawsuits.269
It might be questioned why the floodgates argument would be
used in such a case in the first place, given that the applicable analysis
and its resolution thereof are relatively straightforward.2 70 But this is
precisely the message of Part III.B.2 above, namely that the floodgates
argument invariably is ancillary to otherwise complete legal reason-
ing. Given the obvious caseload implications of a finding of Ap-
prendi's retroactivity,27' and given the straightforward application of
Teague to Apprendis potential retroactivity,2 the lack of any flood-
gates arguments is surprising.
For example, in United States v. Mack, 7 a Third Circuit case that
predates that circuit's rejection of a retroactive Apprendi claim,274
Chief Judge Becker, concurring, expressed a fear that "the number of
Apprendi challenges by incarcerated defendants will soon reach tidal
proportions."2 75 Becker further noted that "[f] ederal courts... will
no doubt soon be required to grapple with the question whether Ap-
prendi applies retroactively on collateral review. 2 76  It is certainly
noteworthy that this appears to be the lone circuit case to consider
the flood of litigation that might follow from a ruling of nonretroac-
tivity.
Nonetheless, Becker is not alone. In Jackson v. United States,77 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held Apprendi to be
retroactive on collateral review. In his first footnote, Judge Paul
Gadola noted:
268 See supra Part IV.A.2. The arguments in favor of retroactivity, however, do not lack merit.
See supra note 252 and accompanying text; see also Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 90-93
(2d Cir. 2003) (concurring opinion) (arguing that Apprendi was a substantive (and not proce-
dural) change in the law and as such is presumptively retroactive on collateral review). This
section is concerned only with the potential floodgates arguments, not the merits of Apprendi's
potential retroactivity on collateral review.
269 In the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2001, almost 4,000 habeas corpus petitions
had been filed in the U.S. district courts. Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, tbl.C-3 (2001), available at
htpp://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/contents.html (Mar. 31, 2002). While the number of
those that would be eligible to challenge on Apprendi grounds is unclear, it does not seem un-
reasonable to assume that most prisoners sentenced according to the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines, or similar state sentencing schemes, would at least try for one bite at the apple.
270 See supra Part IV.A.2.
271 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
272 See supra Part IV.A.2.
273 229 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1045 (2001).
274 See In re Turner, 267 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi has not been
"made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court").
275 Mack, 229 F.3d at 236 (Becker, C.J., concurring).
276 Id. at 236 n.1.
277 129 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
278 Id. at 1059.
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The Court is ruefully aware that, asJustice O'Connor forecast in her dis-
sent in Apprendi, federal courts may now face a "flood of petitions by con-
victed defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in
part on the authority of" Apprendi. But the Court cannot help this situa-
tion because the Court's function is to interpret a statute as Congress in-
tended it to be, and not as the Court might prefer it to be. To the extent
that the statute is ailing, Congress possesses the sole remedy.70
Thus while the courts of appeals that set their circuits' precedents
on the matter were not moved enough to discuss the floodgates,
other courts openly considered that issue.
Regardless of what the courts actually held, the floodgates argu-
ment invariably is an ancillary consideration.28 ' Discussing Apprendis
potential retroactivity is useful because it demonstrates the rule de-
2812lineated above and its exceptions.
B. Applying the "Rule"
Application of the principles explained in Part III above to the
example of Apprendi's retroactivity is not a simple task. The analysis
in this section will assume that an appellate judge is considering
whether or not the floodgates argument should be used in support of
his or her other legal conclusions.
There are essentially three competing factors in this inquiry. The
first is Teague,8 3 the Supreme Court case that governs whether a par-
ticular rule will be applied retroactively on collateral review. 4 The
second is AEDPA, which was an expansive reduction in the availability
of habeas corpus review.2 5 AEDPA "essentially codifies" Teague, 6 ex-
cept for Teague's exceptions to its own rule, which are the only rele-
vant sections here. AEDPA is considered in this section because it is
the result of a congressional desire to limit habeas corpus litigation in
the federal courts. s Third, the writ of habeas corpus is implicated.2
279 Id. at 1059 n.1 (citations omitted).
280 See supra text accompanying notes 268-69 (noting that none of the circuit court cases
denying retroactive application of Apprendi made a floodgates argument). It is certainly possi-
ble, if not likely, that a concern over the possibility of a wave of prisoner suits was an unstated
motivation for some of the courts ruling on the matter.
281 See supra Part III.B.2.
282 See supra Part III.C.
283 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
284 See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001) (holding that new rules of constitutional
law must be made explicitly retroactive before they may be raised in successive habeas peti-
tions). Tyler, which only some of the courts of appeals considered in barring retroactive consid-
eration of Apprendi, further restricts the Teague framework.
285 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
26 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 880-81.
287 See supra text accompanying note 222.
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This is notable because, after all, the "Great Writ", 9 encourages litiga-
290tion.
1. Article III Frustration
The first theory under which one might avoid the constitu-
tional/statutory problems with the floodgates argument would be the
aforementioned "total judicial failure." 9' Under this theory, the
floodgates argument would be acceptable because allowing Apprendi
to be applied retroactively on collateral review would unleash a flood
of litigation so immense that the courts would literally cease to func-
tion properly. It is unmistakably correct that such a decision would
lead to court congestion, either through new lawsuits or appeals.
While it is unclear how much litigation would ensue, it is difficult to
imagine that it would truly bring the level of the courts' functioning
below that envisioned in Article 111.292
2. The Statutory/Case Law Question
The second consideration is far more interesting and nuanced.
The purpose of AEDPA was to streamline the crowded process of ha-
beas litigation and give the federal courts some relief,295and keeping
the floodgates closed would promote that purpose. Furthermore, al-
lowing habeas litigation to flood the courts might arguably frustrate
294AEDPA's statutory purpose.
Similarly, Teague limits habeas litigation through its restrictive view
of the availability of retroactive relief for new rules of constitutional
law on collateral review. 29s While Teague is not itself statutory law, it is
the governing case regarding the retroactive applicability of new rules
on habeas review.
288 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266.
289 See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131 (detailing historical development of
the "Great Writ").
290 Of course, the writ of habeas corpus does not itself actively encourage litigation. Rather,
it encourages litigation in the sense that it provides a mechanism for vindicating personal rights
through litigation.
291 See supra Part III.C.3.
292 See id. The habeas corpus statute's timing provisions necessarily limit the number of first-
time habeas petitioners who might take advantage of a retroactive application of Apprendi. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (delineating a one-year statute of limitations for new habeas petitions).
293 See supra text accompanying note 222.
294 But see supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on inferences of
AEDPA's statutory purpose).
295 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 152, at 872-73 (describing Teague as a case that "substantially
limits the ability of federal courts to hear constitutional claims raised in habeas corpus peti-
tions").
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Finally, there is the writ of habeas corpus itself. There cannot be
any conclusion but that its purpose encourages litigation, creating a
cause of action to attack constitutionally flawed convictions post hoc.
So, then, how do the statute-based exceptions described above in
Parts III.C.1 and III.C.2 apply to this case? The underlying cause of
action, the writ of habeas corpus, encourages litigation to remedy
constitutional violations. This fact counsels in favor of allowing litiga-
tion to remedy a prison sentence that was in violation of the constitu-
tional principles recognized in Apprendi.
On the other hand, AEDPA is Congress's latest word on the mat-
ter. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution mandates that "[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it,"29 6 which includes no mention of preserving the writ as it was in
the Framers' days. As such, there should be no bar to considering
any AEDPA adjustments as superceding authority over any previous
version of the habeas statutes.
Nonetheless, while AEDPA codifies Teague's restrictive view of
retroactivity, it is silent on Teague's exceptions to its rule. There is
thus a legitimate question as to whether AEDPA's purported statutory
purpose should even bear on this question, which would seem to
involve a construction of Teague's exceptions, not the sections that
AEDPA adopted.
In the end, the uncertainty regarding what statutory intent, if any,
would guide the decision of whether or not to use the floodgates ar-
gument is simply too great a concern. That some scholars have con-
cluded that AEDPA was the result of legislative compromise 21 7 only
exacerbates this uncertainty. If that inherent uncertainty is consid-
ered alongside the other flaws in the floodgates argument, it would
seem imprudent to raise the argument in such a situation.
It would be nice to imagine that the judges in the court of appeals
cases2 were guided by the same logic, and ultimately decided against
invoking this flawed argument. Unfortunately, though, it is likely that
the absence of the floodgates argument in the cases holding that Ap-
prendi is not retroactively applicable to collateral review is more by co-
incidence than by design.
CONCLUSION
Judge Posner undoubtedly was correct in noting that the question
of whether judges should consider caseload when deciding cases is
296 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
27 See supra note 224.
M See supra note 250.
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"of some moment" because of the high caseload levels in the federal
courts.00 In arguing that the "floodgates of litigation" argument has
few valid uses, I have not ignored the fact that the federal courts are
quite busy. Nonetheless, I have tried to create a compelling case
against using the fear of the floodgates of litigation in judicial opin-
ions as a remedy for the caseload problem. The argument is too
flawed to continue to be used in the judicial opinions of the federal
courts. The pragmatic uncertainties and inconsistencies,3 0 0 separation
of powers problems,30 ' and shaky (and in most cases, absent) statutory
basiss°' combine to outweigh any beneficial effect the argument might
have.
Furthermore, the floodgates argument is almost always ancillary to
the central holding in a case. When judges invoke the floodgates
argument and its ilk, they needlessly chip away at the reliability and
strength of their other arguments.
I am keenly aware that while I seek to remove one tool of judicial
economy from the realm ofjudging, I offer no solution or palliative
30 3
in its stead. To offer a solution to the federal caseload problem
would be beyond the scope of this Comment.304 Judge Posner dis-
cusses several in The Federal Courts-specialized courts, eliminating or
limiting diversity jurisdiction, increased reliance on alternative dis-
pute resolution, and adding more judges.00 The problem, of course,
is that even Judge Posner recognizes the limitations of his palliatives,
and he offers persuasive criticisms of each.00 While I am not fully
persuaded by Posner's main offering, so-called "structural re-
straint, "30 7 it certainly seems to be a step in the right direction.
While I agree with Posner that "we cannot predict future
[caseload] growth with any confidence,"3 0 I have come to agree with
Professor Keeton that "[i]t is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation.'309
POSNER, supra note 1, at 315; see also supra Part II (describing high federal caseload).
so0 See supra Part III.B.
so1 See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
so2 See supra Part III.A.3.
303 To use Judge Posner's term. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 193-243 (discussing "pallia-
tives").
304 For a good discussion of several caseload-reduction options, see POSNER, supra note 1, at
193-270. See also id. at 160-89 (discussingjudicially created methods of controlling caseload).
305 Id. at 193-270.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 318 (describing structural restraint as a judge's attempt to limit his court's power
over other government institutions).
3o8 POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 12, at 93.
M9 KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 56.
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Whether the caseload grows, remains level, or declines, arguments
that a court is bound to rule lest the floodgates of litigation be
opened should be discounted and mostly, if not entirely, abandoned.
